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Abstract
In November 2014, OPEC announced a new strategy geared towards improving its market
share. Oil-market analysts interpreted this as an attempt to squeeze higher-cost producers,
notably US shale oil, out of the market. Over the next year, crude oil prices crashed,
with large repercussions for the global economy. We present a simple equilibrium model
that explains the fundamental market factors that can rationalize such a “regime switch” by
OPEC: (i) the growth of US shale oil production; (ii) the slowdown of global oil demand; (iii)
reduced cohesiveness of the OPEC cartel; and (iv) production ramp-ups in other non-OPEC
countries; while (v) reductions in US shale costs act against these factors. We show that these
qualitative predictions are broadly consistent with oil market developments during 2014-15.
The model is calibrated to oil market data; it predicts accommodation up to 2014 and a
market-share strategy thereafter, and explains large oil-price swings as well as realistically
high levels of OPEC output.
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1 Introduction
In 2014, global oil supply overtook demand and the oil price started to decline from mid-2014. In
its November 2014 meeting, OPEC1 decided not to reduce supply and prices fell further. Many
oil-market analysts interpreted this as the formal decision to squeeze higher-cost competitors,
including US shale oil extracted using hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), out of the market. The
Saudi Arabian oil minister at the time (and de facto leader of OPEC) expressed intentions
consistent with these interpretations: “In a situation like this, it is di¢cult, if not impossible,
for the kingdom or for OPEC to take any action that would reduce its market share and increase
the shares of others...”2 This decision stood in contrast with OPEC’s coordinated cut during
the Global Financial Crisis.
OPEC’s actions occurred against the backdrop of weakening global demand for crude and
several years of steadily rising capacity from non-OPEC sources–most notably from unconven-
tional sources in the US. Since mid-2014, the oil price fell from above $100 to an average of $50
during 2015. In its December 2015 meeting, OPEC reiterated its commitment to a “market-
share” strategy. Many have opined on whether OPEC is taking a sensible perspective by driving
competitors out of business or whether it is a misguided move tantamount to “hara-kiri”.3
Our goal in this paper is to understand the fundamental market factors that induced the shift
in OPEC’s strategy. We present a simple economic model of the oil market: OPEC has a degree
of market power and competes against a set of non-OPEC producers who act as a price-taking
competitive fringe.4 OPEC has a choice between two strategies. The first strategy, which we call
“accommodate”, is to maximize profits via a “high” oil price which allows high-cost non-OPEC
producers to remain profitable. The second strategy, “squeeze”, is to drive up production–and
hence drive down price–and thereby induce high-cost producers to exit the market.
We show that either of these two strategies can be optimal for OPEC, depending on market
fundamentals. In particular, the market-share strategy becomes relatively more attractive for
OPEC in the face of: (i) slower global oil demand; (ii) greater US shale oil production; (iii)
reduced cohesiveness within OPEC; (iv) higher output in other non-OPEC countries; and (v)
higher costs of US shale. We show that a regime switch from accommodate to squeeze becomes
1The members of The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) for the purposes of analysis
are (in descending order of crude oil capacity for 2015): Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,
Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Qatar, Ecuador, and Libya, although Libya’s capacity is highly constrained
by its security situation. This amounts to cumulative production capacity of 35 mbd. OPEC’s actual crude (31 1
2
mbd) and NGL (6 1
2
mbd) output exceeded 40% of global demand in 2015. After the regime shift relevant for our
analysis took place, Gabon and Indonesia rejoined OPEC, although Indonesia’s status is uncertain at the time of
writing. These countries are excluded unless otherwise indicated.
2Saudi Arabia Oil Minister at the time Mr Al-Naimi cited by Jared Anderson, Energy Quote of the Day: ‘We
Would Lose on Both Market Share and Price’, http://breakingenergy.com, 18 December, 2014
3 Ise (1926) quoted in Yergin (2008).
4Although Saudi Arabia is the dominant player in OPEC, we refer to the broader group as a collective. Saudi
Arabia has accounted for the bulk of OPEC adjustment when responding to moderate changes in the oil market,
but large adjustments in OPEC output have included participation from multiple parties, including collective cuts
during the Global Financial Crisis and some increases in output during the recovery and in response to supply
outages during the Arab Spring. In addition, a lot of recent growth in OPEC capacity and output has come from
Iraq, representing the choice of Iraq to produce more and of other members not to keep collective OPEC output
constant.
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optimal when high-cost production grows beyond a specific point. The model can rationalize
OPEC’s decision to raise output in the face of weaker demand, and help explain a large drop in
the oil price.5
In the empirical part of the paper, we begin with a description of oil-market developments
which highlight how the model’s comparative-statics are pertinent. We give an account of
OPEC’s strategy shift and the market responses of non-OPEC players. We then calibrate the
model to oil6 market data across a range of scenarios. First, we show how the model rationalizes
the oil market in the period preceding the price collapse as a high-price accommodate scenario
where OPEC chooses not to squeeze US shale oil–despite already substantial market-share
erosion and su¢cient spare capacity for a squeeze. Second, we show how some parameter
changes can prompt a rational decision by OPEC to squeeze US shale out of the market. Third,
we show that the model generates squeeze equilibria when calibrated to forecasts of future data
that yield higher OPEC output and lower prices.
Our model exposes the fallacy of interpreting a decline in OPEC’s revenues or profit as
evidence that a market-strategy is necessarily misguided. The simple point is that the relevant
comparison is not how profits compare to an earlier period, but rather how they would compare
to pursuing a di§erent strategy today–for which profits could be even lower. By showing how
a market-share strategy can be optimal for OPEC in a formal framework, we o§er the model
as a potential rational economic explanation for its 2014 strategy switch.7 However, we do not
wish to claim that it is the most likely of a range of possible economic or political motivators.8
Our theory makes a number of simplifying assumptions. The model is static and partial-
equilibrium; it does not explicitly incorporate dynamics such as a producer’s intertemporal
decision to sell today or leave the oil in the ground.9 Relatedly, the model does not feature
inventory behaviour–although we do account for this in the empirical part of the paper. We
also do not address the potential roles of uncertainty, expectations and asymmetric information.
Finally, the production of non-OPEC players is modelled as a binary decision: they produce up
to capacity if price exceeds their cost and otherwise shut down.
OPEC’s market-share strategy is broadly aimed at its high-cost competitors.10 OPEC has
5Weaker demand reduces OPEC profits, all else equal, under both the accommodate and squeeze strategies;
it is not clear a priori how it a§ects the relative attractiveness of two strategies. Our model demonstrates that
lower demand makes the squeeze more preferable.
6Unless crude is specifically mentioned, oil refers to liquids, namely crude oil and natural gas liquids (NGLs)
as these are very close substitutes. The IEA does not distinguish between the two when reporting demand or non-
OPEC supply. For OPEC, these are separated out by the IEA in part because NGLs are not formally part of
OPEC’s quota. Gas, whether natural gas or associated gas generated from the production of liquids, is excluded.
7Mabro (1998) suggests a market-share strategy is not sensible: since conventional oil producers traditionally
have operating costs that are well below prevailing prices, it would take too large price decline to induce their exit.
Our analysis revisits this issue with a more formal economic framework geared towards the distinction between
conventional and unconventional oil production. Earlier, having incurred substantial losses in the early 1980s
following accommodative production cuts (Westelius, 2013), the subsequent rise in output was arguably a shift
to a market-share strategy.
8As argued by Fattouh, Poudine and Sen (2016) for Saudi Arabia, many OPEC countries remain undiversified
and hence reliant on oil for meeting domestic spending pressures, which makes revenue the prime consideration.
9The Hotelling rule is well known to have little empirical explanatory power. Cairns and Calfucura (2012)
argue it is only relevant for producers with a limited resource horizon, which is not the case for the large oil
producers.
10 “[The policy to defend market share] is also a defense of high e¢ciency producing countries, not only of market
3
recently disputed a common perception in the industry by stating that it is not targeting specific
countries or production technologies.11 Nonetheless, the market-share strategy illustrated in this
paper emphasizes US shale; this is the main focus of oil-market analysts partly because its short
life-cycle relative to conventional oil extraction makes the US supply response to prices quicker
(Bjornland, Nordvik and Rohrer, 2016). Our static model’s marginal costs include upfront
expenses for US shale but excludes the large (sunk) investment costs of other producers.
Related literature. Although there has been a lot of policy-related discussion since November
2014, we believe ours is at the forefront of papers beginning to o§er a formal economic model
of OPEC’s strategy shift and its repercussions. Fattouh, Poudineh and Sen (2016) analyze the
trade-o§s between a strategy of market share and one of curtailing output to generate near-term
revenue. Introducing uncertainty about the nature of US shale tends to favor accommodation
but, as further information reduces this uncertainty, a switch in strategy becomes more likely.12
There remains considerable debate on the extent to which OPEC members cooperate when
setting output or prices (Smith, 2005; Bremond, Hache, and Mignon, 2012; Nakov and Nuño,
2013; Huppmann, 2013). Almoguera, Douglas and Herrera (2011) suggest that OPEC’s behav-
iour is a mix of near-collusive episodes and subsequent non-cooperative breakdowns. Pierru,
Smith and Zamrik (2016) analyze how OPEC (or a subset of members) stabilizes prices through
optimization of spare capacity. Huppmann and Holz (2012) find that OPEC’s degree of market
power has declined, and Fattouh and Mahadeva (2013) attribute fluctuations in this power to
market conditions.
Our approach is flexible in that we calibrate OPEC’s market power to fit the data across
each of our scenarios. We obtain parameters that describe the level of competition in the
market and are broadly in line with those from the empirical literature. Pricing regimes fall
short of a perfect cartel but still allow low-cost producers (OPEC and non-OPEC) to earn rents.
Our accommodate strategy also has OPEC o§set other producers’ production changes, and our
squeeze strategy has some similarity with Stackelberg behaviour (Huppmann, 2013). OPEC’s
decision between these strategies is influenced by its time-varying ability to coordinate and
its market-dependent choice means that its market power is endogenous. Complementing the
longer-term views in the existing literature, we focus on market developments since 2014.
The strategy pursued by OPEC against high-cost producers in our model is a form of “limit
pricing”. An advantage of our approach over classic industrial-organization theory is that it
does not rely on the dynamic of a later period with again-higher prices in which OPEC can
recoup “lost” profits.13 Our model shows that OPEC’s profits under a low-price squeeze can be
share. We want to tell the world that high e¢ciency producing countries are the ones that deserve market share.
That is the operative principle in all capitalist countries.” Saudi Arabia Oil Minister at the time Mr Al-Naimi
cited in Middle East Economic Survey Interview, 21 December 2014.
11 “We have not declared war on shale or on production from any given country or company.” Saudi Arabia Oil
Minister at the time Mr Al-Naimi cited in CBS News Moneywatch, “Saudi Arabia: We have not declared war on
shale,” 23 February 2016.
12They also note that OPEC allowing for more price volatility introduces uncertainty for prospective entrants
and can discourage entry as a result.
13Classic limit-pricing theory relies on the “incumbent” player raising price again following the exit of the
weaker “entrant” (Tirole, 1988: Chapter 9). Under perfect information, this leads to a credibility problem: the
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permanently higher than under accommodate. In related work, Andrade de Sá and Daubanes
(2016) suggest that OPEC prices out of the market any “backstop technology” which has large
potential to erode oil demand. Their main focus is on how this behaviour di§ers from a Hotelling
rule and the implications for carbon-tax design.
Finally, there are a number of analyses of what caused the 2014-2015 oil price crash, repre-
senting di§erent views on the relative contributions of demand, supply and speculative factors
(Ba§es et al., 2015; Baumeister and Kilian, 2016; Beidas-Strom and Osorio-Buitron, 2015;
Hamilton, 2015; and Hussain et al., 2015). Although the precise contributions can be hard to
pin down, many support the view that the drivers laid out in our model played a role. Smith
(2009) demonstrates how the combination of low demand and supply elasticities can account
for historical levels of oil price volatility–without any role for any volatility-enhancing financial
speculation. Our model highlights how demand and supply shocks can be interlinked: an oil
price decline caused by weaker demand is magnified where it also induces an endogenous shift in
OPEC supply behaviour. By showing how high-cost supply can reach a “tipping point” that in-
vokes an OPEC supply increase, it demonstrates how seemingly small rises in non-OPEC supply
in the period of study can lead to large price drops. In a similar vein, Verleger (2016) emphasizes
the vital role that market structure plays for oil prices.
Outline of the paper. Section 2 sets up the model and analyses its “accommodate” and
“squeeze” equilibria. Section 3 presents the comparative statics that favour a regime switch,
and a testable condition on when it occurs. Section 4 argues that the comparative-statics
predictions are consistent with market experience. Section 5 presents a quantitative calibration
of the model to oil-market data across a range of scenarios. Section 6 concludes.
2 A simple equilibrium model of the oil market
2.1 Setup of the model
The global demand curve for oil takes the linear form D(P ) = (α − P )/β, with parameters
α,β > 0. This is a common assumption in the literature, and will facilitate empirical calibration
of the model later on. On the supply side, there are N+1 oil producers, namely OPEC, denoted
as i, plus N other non-OPEC players. OPEC has production capacityKi with a marginal cost of
production of Ci. Of the other producers, player n 2 N has capacity Kn and unit cost Cn; it is a
price-taker which sells up to capacity if P > Cn and zero otherwise. Let Cj ≡ maxn2N{Cn} > Ci
denote the player j with the highest unit cost, and capacity Kj . In the present analysis, we take
this to be US shale oil because it is the highest-cost producer in our chosen period of analysis,
but this could generalize to any highest-cost producer. Let K` ≡
P
n2N\{j}Kn denote the
combined production capacity of all other non-OPEC players. Note that the setup implies that
all non-OPEC players produce up to capacity whenever US shale oil does so (but not necessarily
entrant realizes that price will go back up (making re-entry profitable), so cannot be induced to exit in the first
place. Thus limit pricing does not work without the addition of another market imperfection such as asymmetric
information (which allows the incumbent to build a “tough” reputation by pricing low).
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vice versa).
OPEC has market power and can choose between two strategies:
1. “Accommodate”: Maximizing its profits taking as given that player j produces up to its
capacity level Kj ;
2. “Squeeze”: Lowering the market price to Cj , thus squeezing player j out of the market.
The first of these corresponds to what is often called a “price” strategy whilst the second is
about “market share”. Our main question is, which of these two strategies is more profitable
for OPEC?
In practice, OPEC is not an e¢cient cartel: its internal ability to restrict output has fallen
short of what monopoly pricing would require. To capture this, we use a parameter λ 2 (0, 1] as a
reduced form of OPEC’s pricing power under the accommodation strategy. The case with λ = 1
corresponds to a fully-e¢cient cartel (facing a competitive fringe); lower values of λ represent
weaker pricing power.14 As will become clear, our theory does not hinge on the precise value of
λ, but this parameter plays an important role in the calibration exercise later on.
2.2 Analysis of the strategies
We begin by deriving OPEC’s profits under each of the two strategies. Two assumptions on
parameter values are made:
A1. (Cj − Ci) < λ[(α− Cj)− β(Kj +K`)]
A2. (α− Cj) ≤ β(Ki +K`)
The first assumption ensures that player j (US shale oil in this paper) is viable under the
“accommodation” strategy. It implies that all other non-OPEC producers are also viable, and
that OPEC is too (since they all have lower costs); in particular, note that λ cannot be too small.
The second assumption ensures that OPEC has su¢cient spare capacity to be able to carry out
the “squeeze”. A1 and A2 together imply (Cj−Ci) < λ [(α− Cj)− β(Kj +K`)] ≤ λβ(Ki−Kj),
so that OPEC has significantly higher production capacity than US shale, specifically Ki >
Kj + (Cj −Ci)/λβ (where Cj > Ci). We verify that these parameter assumptions are satisfied
in the empirical calibration of the model.
2.2.1 Strategy 1: Accommodate
Since OPEC is the only strategic player it can equivalently choose price or its output level to
maximize its profits–given that by A2 it always has su¢cient capacity Ki. (Since our model
features a dominant player with a competitive fringe, rather than oligopolistic interaction, it
is not sensitive to whether the choice variable is price (Bertrand) or quantity (Cournot). For
expositional reasons, we let OPEC choose prices–though we stress that our results would be
14Lower pricing may also be the result of dynamic considerations which we do not model explicitly here, or
because some domestic OPEC stakeholders wish to maximize revenue rather than profits.
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unchanged by instead having OPEC choose its production level.) OPEC faces residual demand
{D(P )−Kj −K`} and thus chooses price to:
max
P
Πi(P ) ≡ {D(P )−Kj −K`} (P − Ci)
=
1
β
{(α− P )− β(Kj +K`)} (P − Ci).
The parameter λ 2 (0, 1] captures how e§ective OPEC is at raising the price. We thus write the
first-order condition as 0 = {λ [(α− P )− β(Kj +K`)]− (P − Ci)}. The parameter λ captures
the weight received by the inframarginal units of production, [(α− P )− β(Kj +K`)], relative
to the marginal unit on which OPEC earns a margin of (P − Ci). So the “optimal” price for
OPEC equals
P ∗ =
Ci + λ[α− β(Kj +K`)]
(1 + λ)
. (1)
This price declines with lower values of λ, and falls towards i’s marginal cost Ci as λ ! 0.15
However, our assumption A1 is equivalent to λ being su¢ciently high such that P ∗ > Cj , so
that US shale is viable. (Note also that [α − β(Kj +K`)] > 0 by A1.) The price P ∗ also falls
continuously with higher non-OPEC production, Kj +K`. The corresponding production level
for OPEC is given by:
S∗i ≡ {D(P ∗)−Kj −K`}
=
1
β
{[α− β(Kj +K`)]− P ∗} = [α− β(Kj +K`)− Ci]
(1 + λ)β
. (2)
So OPEC optimally absorbs higher production capacity of non-OPEC players, Kj + K`, at a
rate of [100/(1+λ)]%, that is, dS∗i /d(Kj+K`) = −1/(1+λ). Since λ 2 (0, 1], this rate is at least
50% and rises towards 100% as λ falls, that is, as OPEC becomes less e§ective at raising the
price. In this sense, OPEC here acts as a “swing producer”: for λ = 1, it behaves like a textbook
Stackelberg leader and accommodates 50 percent of any change in non-OPEC production; for
λ! 0, it almost fully accommodates changes in non-OPEC production.
It follows that OPEC’s profits under this strategy are:
Π∗i = S
∗
i (P
∗ − Ci) = λ
β
"
(α− Ci)− β(Kj +K`)
(1 + λ)
#2
. (3)
The profits of non-OPEC player n 2 N , which produces Kn by construction, are simply equal
to Kn(P ∗ − Cn), and are positive by A1.
2.2.2 Strategy 2: Squeeze
Here the price P ∗∗ = Cj by definition, and OPEC can again equivalently choose this price or
the corresponding output level. This implies that US shale oil (player j) sells zero while all other
non-OPEC players still produce up to a combined capacity of K` (given their individual costs
15 It is easy to check that the second-order condition is satisfied for any λ > 0.
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are each below Cj). The corresponding total market output satisfies D(P ∗∗) = (α−Cj)/β, from
which it follows that OPEC’s sales are market output net of remaining non-OPEC production
S∗∗i ≡ {D(P ∗∗)−K`} =
(α− Cj)
β
−K`. (4)
By A2, OPEC has su¢cient capacity for this level of sales, i.e., S∗∗i ≡ {D(P ∗∗)−K`} ≤ Ki.
Thus OPEC’s profits under this strategy are:
Π∗∗i = S
∗∗
i (P
∗∗ − Ci) = 1
β
[(α− Cj)− βK`] (Cj − Ci). (5)
Thus OPEC’s profits under the squeeze do not depend on the λ parameter which captures
its pricing power under the previous accommodate strategy. The profits of non-OPEC player
n 2 N\{j} are Kn(P ∗∗ − Cn), and are positive since Cj ≡ maxn2N{Cn} = P ∗∗ > Cn for all
n 2 N\{j}.
3 Model results
We now turn to our main results on the di§erent market factors which can lead to a “regime
switch” under which OPEC finds it optimal to squeeze player j.
The preceding analysis already pins down the di§erence in profits between the two strategies,
∆Πi ≡ (Π∗∗i −Π∗i ). Here we begin with some comparative statics on which market factors lead
to a rise in ∆Πi, and then obtain a quantitative result on when ∆Πi > 0, i.e., the squeeze is
preferred from OPEC’s viewpoint.
Proposition 1 The “squeeze” strategy becomes relatively more attractive compared to the “ac-
commodate” strategy, in that it o§ers relatively higher profits (that is, higher ∆Πi), for OPEC
under the following conditions:
(i) the production capacity of high-cost player j (Kj) is larger;
(ii) the internal cohesiveness of OPEC (λ) is lower;
(iii) the global demand for crude oil (α) is lower;
(iv) the marginal cost of player j (Cj) is higher;
(v) the production capacity of other non-OPEC players (K`) is larger.
The comparative statics from Proposition 1 are intuitive. First, larger production by player
j (e.g., US shale) depresses price under the accommodation strategy but its production is zero
by construction under the squeeze strategy, regardless of capacity. This makes squeezing more
shale out of the market look relatively more attractive to OPEC.
Similarly, if OPEC is less internally cohesive, then it cannot raise price as strongly and extract
as much profit under accommodation. Under the squeeze, the degree of price coordination is
not a factor so this again favours the squeeze strategy.
Third, weaker global demand for crude depresses profits under both the accommodate and
the squeeze strategies, so the comparison is less straightforward. However note that, under
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accommodation, lower demand reduces both OPEC’s sales and its profit margin. By contrast,
under the squeeze, lower demand only reduces sales–since the price is pinned down by the
marginal cost of the squeezed-out player. Thus the model shows how lower demand relatively
favours the squeeze strategy.16
Fourth, higher costs of player j have no impact on the accommodate equilibrium from
OPEC’s viewpoint: since player j remains viable by A1, and produces up to capacity, higher
costs simply mean less profits for player j but no change in the market equilibrium. However,
the squeeze strategy becomes more attractive as less of a price decline is needed to squeeze US
shale out of the market.
Finally, higher production by other non-OPEC players also makes the squeeze relatively
more attractive. Similar to the demand e§ect, this reduces both price and OPEC sales under
accommodate but solely its sales under the squeeze strategy.
Proposition 1 delivers a clean set of qualitative “all-else-equal” results which can be taken
to the data. In practice, many of these market factors–global demand patterns, oil production
capacities and costs, OPEC’s internal dynamics–change simultaneously. Our empirical analysis
in Sections 4 and 5 therefore considers the evolution of all of these market factors together.
The comparison of profits between the two strategies leads to the following quantitative
prediction:
Proposition 2 OPEC prefers the squeeze strategy (that is, ∆Πi > 0) whenever the production
capacity of high-cost player j is su¢ciently large,
Kj >
"
1
β
 
(α− Ci)− (1 + λ)
r
1
λ
[(α− Cj)− βK`] (Cj − Ci)
!
−K`
#
≡ Kj
and otherwise accommodates if Kj ≤ Kj. At this “regime switch”, the oil price falls discontin-
uously from P ∗(Kj) = Ci +
p
(1/λ) [(α− Cj)− βK`] (Cj − Ci) to P ∗∗ = Cj.
Put simply, it is a profitable strategy for OPEC to squeeze out a rival selling Kj units at
cost Cj whenever “the prize” is su¢ciently large in that Kj > Kj . Under this condition, the
subsequent gain in market share outweighs the fall in price.
Proposition 2 thus delivers a critical value Kj which determines which of the two strategies
is optimal for OPEC. This critical value depends on demand and cost conditions as well as other
non-OPEC players’ production capacities. It lends itself to quantitative empirical testing, which
we pursue in Section 5.
We stress that the optimality of the market-share strategy does not rely on a subsequent
“harvesting” period with again-higher prices after the high-cost players have been squeezed out
of the market.
16The industrial-organization literature on collusion comes to conflicting views on how the cycle a§ects the
stability of price coordination (Tirole, 1988: Chapter 6). On the one hand, there is a greater short-term temptation
to cheat when demand is high; equilibrium prices are thus lower in booms in order to limit this incentive to cheat.
On the other hand, with imperfect observability of actions, firms cannot perfectly distinguish between rivals
cheating and low demand; thus price wars are more likely during busts. Similarly, the incentive to deviate is
typically stronger when future demand is falling. Our model results are consistent with the latter perspective.
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We thus obtain a further result on OPEC supply following a regime switch:
Proposition 3 (i) Suppose that an increase in capacity of player j, from K 0j ≤ Kj to K 0j > Kj,
induces a regime switch from accommodate to squeeze. This leads to an increase in OPEC’s
production, S∗∗i > S
∗
i .
(ii) Suppose that a decline in global oil demand, from α0 to α00, induces a regime switch from
accommodate to squeeze, that is, Kj ≤ Kj(α0) but Kj > Kj(α00). This leads to an increase in
OPEC’s production, S∗∗i > S
∗
i , as long as the demand decline ∆α ≡ (α0 − α00) is not too large.
Proposition 3 shows how OPEC’s optimal supply responses can take an unexpected form.
Standard intuition from economic theory, as well as the usual logic of a “swing producer”, suggest
that higher rival output and lower demand should prompt a “soft” response in the form of lower
OPEC supply. While this is true within an accommodate strategy, the situation is di§erent if
these market factors induce a regime switch. Then higher US shale production can induce a
“fighting response” from OPEC, and lower demand can make it optimal to produce more.
We next illustrate the workings of the model using two simple examples which, respectively,
highlight the sensitivities of OPEC behaviour with respect to (1) US shale production and (2)
global demand conditions–corresponding to parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3.
Example 1. Let α = 250, β = 1, Ci = 0, Cj = 50 and λ = 1; all players except i,j are inactive,
K` ≡ 0. A1 and A2 boil down to Kj < 150 and Ki ≥ 200. OPEC’s profits under accommodation
Π∗i = (125− 12Kj)2 using (3) while Π∗∗i = S∗∗i P ∗∗ = 200× 50 = 10,000 under the squeeze using
(5). As claimed by Proposition 2, Π∗∗i ≥ Π∗i , Kj ≥ Kj = 50. Imagine that US shale’s Kj
gradually grows from zero: OPEC produces S∗i = (125− 12Kj) under accommodation, o§setting
Kj at a rate of 50%. At Kj the regime then switches to squeeze and OPEC’s production jumps
to S∗∗i = 200 by Proposition 3(i), for which it has spare capacity by A2. (The price falls smoothly
from P ∗(0) = 125 to P ∗(Kj) = 100, and then crashes to P ∗∗ = 50.) Figure 1 illustrates how
OPEC profits are lower when US shale capacity is higher; it also reveals how OPEC profits are
higher under the squeeze than they would have been had it continued to accommodate. Figure
2 shows how, as a result, OPEC supply rises once US shale capacity becomes su¢ciently large.
INSERT FIGURES 1 & 2 AROUND HERE
Example 2. Let β = 1, Ci = 0, Cj = 50, λ = 1, K` ≡ 0 but now let Kj = 50. A1 is α > 150
(global demand is always high enough for US shale to be viable) while A2 becomesKi ≥ (α−50).
OPEC’s profits under accommodation Π∗i =
1
4 (α− 50)2 using (3) and Π∗∗i = (α−50)×50 under
the squeeze using (5). Direct comparison shows that Π∗∗i ≥ Π∗i , α ≤ 250 ≡ α. Imagine
that global demand gradually declines, beginning from, say, α = 350 (requiring Ki ≥ 300 for
A2). OPEC produces S∗i =
1
2(α − 50) ≤ 150 under accommodation, o§setting declining α at a
rate of 50%. Once demand has weakened to α, there is a regime switch, at which point OPEC’s
production jumps from S∗i (α) = 100 to S
∗∗
i (α) = 200 using (4). Production then declines towards
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S∗∗i = 100 as α ! 150. (The price P ∗(α) falls smoothly from P ∗(350) = 150 to P ∗(α) = 100,
crashing to P ∗∗ = 50 with the regime switch.) Figure 3 illustrates how OPEC profits are “more
sensitive” to demand under accommodation–which is more profitable for “high” demand, while
the squeeze is preferred for “low” demand. Again, profits are lower under the squeeze–but
they would have been even lower had OPEC accommodated US shale in a low-demand market.
Figure 4 illustrates how OPEC production can optimally rise in response to weaker demand.
INSERT FIGURES 3 & 4 AROUND HERE
4 Qualitative empirical discussion
This section begins with a discussion of how oil market developments in the run up to late 2014
would have driven a regime switch in light of our comparative-statics results from Proposition
1. We then give an account of OPEC’s decision in its November 2014 meeting to adopt a
“market-share strategy” and its actions since. Finally, we explain the subsequent responses of
other oil-market players.
4.1 Drivers of regime switch
This part describes the four developments from Proposition 1 that favoured OPEC’s decision
to squeeze US shale, namely: (i) weakening demand; strengthening supply from (ii) US shale
and (iii) non-OPEC non-shale sources, as well as (iv) coordination di¢culties among OPEC
members. One factor acting against these is (v) falling US shale oil costs. Finally, although it
is not a direct driver of the regime choice, we discuss OPEC capacity as it is indirectly relevant
via A2.
Weakening global demand (lower than expected α). Having grown weakly in recent
years, demand growth slowed further from 1.2 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2013 to only 0.9
mbd in 2014, a growth rate of less than 1 percent (Figures 5 and 6). As a result, Q3 2014 actual
demand levels were 0.5 mbd lower than forecast in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA)
June Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR) and Q4 demand levels were almost 0.4 mbd lower
than forecast in the September report. In other words, α was lower than anticipated. According
to Proposition 1, weakening demand makes a decision to squeeze more likely.
Demand for oil is structurally restrained by disappointing economic growth after the Global
Financial Crisis. Global GDP grew on average by 313 percent in 2013-4, which is slower than
in previous years and left GDP levels below forecasts (IMF, 2012; 2014). In addition, the
composition of GDP is shifting to less energy-intensive sectors. Further constraints to oil demand
include e¢ciency improvements, fuel switching to natural gas and biofuels, and environmental
restrictions (IEA, 2014; Verleger, 2016).
INSERT FIGURES 5 & 6 AROUND HERE
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Higher US shale output (higher Kj). Reversing a decline since the early 1980s, US crude
oil output rose from about 5 mbd in 2008 to 612 mbd in 2012. Accelerating output reached
about 812 mbd in 2014 and an estimated 9
1
2 mbd in 2015 (Energy Information Administration,
2013, 2016a). (Using the slightly broader definition of oil reported by the IEA (2016a), US output
reached an estimated 13 mbd in 2015.) The increase is attributable to growth in oil extracted
from unconventional sources. Production of light tight oil (LTO), which is one measure of shale
production, almost doubled from 214 mbd in 2012 to 4
1
4 mbd in 2014.
17 Over the two years,
this was the primary source of incremental global supply and almost matched growth in global
demand.
Realized values repeatedly exceeded forecasts by agencies, indicating a surprise element. For
example, US output in 2014 was 34 mbd higher than anticipated by the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) early in its January 2013 Short-term Energy Outlook, and output for the
third quarter of 2014 alone exceeded IEA forecasts for that quarter made in June 2014 by the
same amount. Moreover, forecasts for future output also rose due to base e§ects and revised
expectations about the pace of technical progress. For example, EIA estimates for 2019 LTO
output were revised upwards by about 34 mbd between the 2014 and 2015 editions of their Annual
Energy Outlook (2014, 2015A) despite a decline in prices that had already begun. In terms of
our framework, actual and anticipated US shale production volumes were becoming too large
for OPEC to accommodate.
Higher non-OPEC non-shale output (higher K`). After accounting for the rise in US
shale, non-OPEC output from other sources also rose. The contribution to global supply growth
was small in 2013, but output rose by 1.4 mbd in 2014. Much of the increase came from
Brazil and Canada. Russia’s oil output was until recently higher than for the United States,
holding steady at 10.9 mbd in 2014. There was also a surprise element; output for Q4 of 2014
was some 0.3 mbd higher than anticipated by the IEA in September of that year. The rise in
non-OPEC output made a decision by OPEC to squeeze US shale more likely.
OPEC coordination di¢culties (lower λ). Increased coordination di¢culties would make
OPEC producers less likely to cooperate to accommodate non-OPEC producers in the face of
weakening demand. Although OPEC is literally the textbook model of cartels, there is an exten-
sive literature debating this. OPEC has at times been characterized as being closer to a fringe
of non-cooperative (OPEC and non-OPEC) producers that is led by Saudi Arabia (Huppmann
and Holz, 2012; Huppmann, 2013; Nakov and Nuno, 2013) or a small subset of OPEC members
(Bremond, Hache and Mignon, 2012). Smith (2005) argues that OPEC members are more co-
operative as a cartel which is possibly led by a core group. Almoguera et al. (2011) conclude
OPEC behaves more like (uncooperative) Cournot competitors with a non-OPEC fringe.18
17Alternative measures yield similar results. Production in the Eagle Ford and Bakken formations alone doubled
to about 2 1
2
mbd, while proxies reported by the World Bank (Ba§es et al, 2015) indicate a doubling from 2 mbd
to 4 mbd. US oil extracted by fracking rose by a similar magnitude to account for about half of US crude
production in 2014, while conventional output declined slightly (EIA, 2016b).
18Others have discussed the dominant role of Saudi Arabia as a swing producer that has targeted a specific price
that balances the trade-o§ between short-term government funding needs and discouraging long-term incentives
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Structural factors that could contribute to this lack of coordination include di§erences in
characteristics across members–with those in worse fiscal situations feeling less able to cut
output and those with more reserves having a longer-term perspective; the absence of inter-
nal compensation or an e§ective enforcement mechanism; and monitoring costs. Iraq’s formal
exemption from the quota following its history of sanctions and OPEC’s relatively low global
market share by historical standards may have acted to reduce scope for coordination (Fattouh
and Mahadeva, 2013; Huppmann and Holz, 2015).
Huppmann and Holz (2012) find that OPEC’s degree of market power declined significantly
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, which in our context corresponds to a drop in λ. The
media has recently reported widening rifts among members, including increasingly unproductive
OPEC meetings. Long accustomed to arriving early at OPEC’s two meetings per year to build
consensus among members, Saudi Arabia’s oil minister reportedly arrived at the last minute to
the mid-2014 event, stayed only for a few hours, and suggested a reduction in meeting frequency
to just once a year as he believed there was little point in talking.19
Lower marginal costs for US shale (lower Cj). Cost estimates for US shale vary con-
siderably due to uncertainties as well as inconsistencies in cost definition (Kleinberg, Paltsev,
Ebinger, Hobbs, and Boersma, 2016).20 Some proprietary estimates include only the costs of
finding and extracting the oil, while others add overheads, transportation, or a hurdle rate for
the cost of capital. Wellhead breakeven prices averaged $75 in 2014 with a range of $56 to $85
reflecting variation across US shale plays (Rystad Energy, 2016). This commonly cited proxy
does not cover all costs and may not be the most comprehensive. For the same year, Kleinberg et
al. (2016) distinguish between full cycle costs, the most comprehensive and closest to "long-run"
costs, of $60-$90; half-cycle costs, which include capital expenditure (including on new wells)
needed to sustain production in a field, of $50-$70; and lifting costs, broadly equivalent to pure
variable or operating costs, of below $15. These are in reality average rather than marginal costs
(although our model assumes equivalence).
It has been widely reported that these costs have been falling. For example, Rystad Energy
(2016) show a decline of $30 between 2013 and 2015. Drivers include technology improvements
such as shorter well completion times;21 superior seismic data thanks to software, sensors and
lasers; the use of sand, better liquids, or even microbes for fracking; refracking of wells; and
stripping idle rigs for parts (The Economist, 2015; Brousseau, 2016). These improvements would
have acted to discourage or postpone OPEC’s decision to try to curtail shale production.
Higher OPEC spare capacity (higher Ki). The “call on OPEC crude” is the di§erence
to substitute away from oil before reserves are exhausted (Behar and Pant, 2015; Cairns and Calfucura, 2012).
In a 1998 interview, Mr Al-Naimi stated that Saudi Arabia had formally abandoned the role of swing producer
in the 1980s (Westelius, 2013).
19Reported by The Wall Street Journal, 5 October 2014 “OPEC Members’ Discord Adds to Slide in Oil Prices”.
20Ebinger (2014) notes “While various pundits have opined on this question, the truth of the matter is that no
analyst really knows the full range of production costs across the unconventional crude oil production continuum
since this information is highly proprietary.”
21For example, the time between permit applications and production declined by about 10 percent between the
start of 2012 and 2014 (Currie, 2016).
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between global oil demand and non-OPEC supply (and OPEC NGLs).22 In 2014, the call
declined by 1.8 mbd to less than 30 mbd, leaving it 1 mbd short of crude output. The implied
512 mbd of spare crude capacity compares with only about 3 mbd in 2011. Over the same period,
OPEC’S NGL capacity increased by 12 mbd.
In 2011, Libya’s conflict saw its oil output collapse by 1 mbd. Production was restored in
2012, but renewed political and security disruptions once again cut output in 2013-14. Saudi
Arabia increased output to o§set Libya’s disruptions, while other countries including the UAE
and Kuwait also decided to raise output. When Libya’s output began to recover, there was
no corresponding net decrease by other members. In fact, Saudi Arabia and other countries
increased output further in 2012 and sustained high oil output in subsequent years.23
Trends in Iran and Iraq broadly o§set one another between 2011 and 2014. Iraq continued
to increase its capacity in 2014, which surprised many given Islamic State’s territory gains in
that country. Although Iran’s technical capacity may have remained intact, the US oil embargo
imposed binding constraints on Iran’s ability to sell oil. However, the interim deal signed with
the P5+1 in August 2013 helped Iran’s output stabilize in 2014.24
4.2 OPEC’s actions and market responses
As the oil price decline continued in the second half of 2014, many OPEC members repeatedly
signaled a regime switch, indicating they opposed cutting output and intended to defend market
share. Saudi o¢cials indicated their belief that shale producers’ costs are high (approaching
$100), that Saudi costs are less than $10, and that market equilibrium should be restored by
reductions in supply from high cost producers (Middle East Economic Survey, 2014).25
Nonetheless, the OPEC meeting in November 2014 surprised many by the seemingly collec-
tive decision not to reduce its quota to match the demand for its crude, or at least to reduce
actual output to meet the quota. In our framework, this is consistent with the formal announce-
ment by OPEC to squeeze US shale production rather than accommodate it. In its December
2015 meeting, OPEC reiterated its commitment to market-share. However, in November 2016,
OPEC agreed to a production cut, but the reductions are modest and, at the time of writing, it
is not clear that the targets will be met for a sustained period.
Data have been consistent with a market share strategy. The call on OPEC remained below
30 mbd in 2015, yet OPEC production increased by 114 mbd. 2016 data indicate a rise of
another 1 mbd as Saudi Arabia and other important players produce near record highs. This
implies a rise in OPEC’s market share to 40.5 percent. Upward revisions of future capacity
growth acted to re-enforce the decision to squeeze (IEA, 2016b). Much of the capacity growth
22As mentioned earlier, NGLs are not part of OPEC’s quota of 30 mbd.
23Further discussion is available in Behar and Pant (2015).
24Libya and Iran were not the only countries to experience supply disruptions. Verleger (2016) notes that
unanticipated global supply outages rose from 1 mbd to 3 mbd after 2011.
25 “Saudi Arabia ... enjoys very low production costs. And we are more e¢cient than other producers.
It is an advantage we will use, as any producer would...”- Saudi Arabia Oil Minister, Mr Al-Naimi (2015:
www.saudiembassy.net/announcement/announcement03041501.aspx).
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is accounted for by traditional political rivals26 and by additional members,27 so discord among
OPEC has intensified and arguably acted to make a coordinated cut less feasible. The excess
supply pressures that had built up in 2014 did not unwind in 2015, leaving oil cheaper at the
end of 2015 than at the start and averaging $50 for the year. Although excess supply started to
decrease in 2016, oil prices are set to average less than $45 (IMF, 2016).
In response, US shale supply started scaling back. Late-2016 production was 34 mbd (16
percent) below the peaks attained in early 2015 (EIA, 2016c) and 1 mbd lower than the 2016
forecast published the previous year (EIA, 2015b).28 This is consistent with the squeeze, but US
output has been more resilient than many market participants expected. Between 2014 and 2016,
wellhead breakeven costs have fallen by almost half to about $40 (Rystad Energy, 2016) owing
to further e¢ciency gains and by concentrating on the best oil wells (The Economist, 2016).
Producers have used oil price hedges and financing innovations to avert or postpone bankruptcy
(Verleger, 2016). Non-OPEC non-shale multinationals have responded to the weaker oil price
by laying o§ workers, cutting investment, and in some cases postponing or canceling some
exploration projects (The Economist, 2016). As a result, non-OPEC capacity forecasts for the
next 5 years have been reduced (IEA, 2015; IEA, 2016b). In terms of actual production, 2016
estimates indicate a modest decline of 12 mbd (1
1
2 percent) relative to 2015 (IEA, 2016a).
29
Lower prices contributed to a demand acceleration of 112 mbd in 2015 (IEA, 2016a). However,
this rise is small considering the oil price decline, suggesting renewed weakness that has acted
to re-enforce the market share strategy. 2015 GDP growth of 314 percent was below forecasts
and lower than every year since 2009 (IMF, 2016). Oil demand growth is expected to slow again
to 114 mbd in 2016 (IEA, 2016a).
5 Quantitative empirical calibration
This section matches the events described above to the model by combining observed data and
empirically supported parameter values. We start with two snapshots from before the oil price
crash (in 2012 and 2014) that confirm that the model predicts the high oil prices and relatively
restrained OPEC production consistent with an accommodate equilibrium. We proceed to a
set of six illustrative counterfactual scenarios that demonstrate a squeeze. They show in a
26Confidence in Iraq’s ability to continue capacity growth was restored and could coincide with growth from
Iran following the final nuclear deal signed in July 2015.
27 Indonesia and Gabon rejoined OPEC in December 2015 and July 2016, respectively, making an additional 1
mbd of capacity available for an OPEC squeeze. Following reports of suspension at the November 2016 OPEC
meeting, Indonesia’s status is uncertain. To facilitate comparison in the figures and charts presented in this
section, Indonesia and Gabon are excluded from OPEC in all years. In the calibrations to be presented in the
next section, they are only part of OPEC in the predicted data for future years.
28There is econometric evidence that US shale oil is more price-responsive than conventional oil (Bjornland et
al, 2016).
29The distinction between output reductions for shale and capacity/investment reductions for non-shale re-
sources can be explained by di§erences in product lifecycles. Shorter production cycles mean that full-cycle or
long-run costs are relevant over a shorter objective time frame for shale than for conventional sources. US shale’s
costs are the world’s highest only over a shorter time frame. Conventional oil extraction entails large upfront
sunk costs but low subsequent marginal variable costs. As a result, it would take extremely low prices to induce
rapid exit from “high long-run cost” conventional resources such as the Canadian oil sands.
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stylized way how market developments or a revised calculation by OPEC could induce a change
of strategy. Finally, we have two instances where we apply the model to future data to show it
generates a squeeze equilibrium, which in turn predicts higher OPEC supply and low prices in
line with forecasts.
5.1 Calibration approach and data
This subsection describes how values are sourced or calculated; see also Appendix B for a listing
of our data sources. Actual oil prices and forecasts (based on futures markets) are the nominal
Average Petroleum Spot Price (APSP) taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO)
database, specifically those used for the October 2016 World Economic Outlook .
On the demand side, actual historical or future forecast demand quantities in millions of
barrels per day (mbd) are sourced from various issues of the MOMR and IEA (2016b). A key
parameter is β, which is chosen so as to ensure demand elasticities that are consistent with
estimates in the literature. Setting β = 8 implies an elasticity of demand of almost —.15 when
oil prices are $100 and around —.07 when oil prices are $50. This range falls comfortably within
the confines of empirical work.30 Unless otherwise indicated, we solve for the shift parameter α
using actual demand, actual prices, and β (recall that our demand curve is D(P ) = (α−P )/β).
Actual historical global supply and inventory changes, which account for discrepancies with
respect to global demand, are also sourced from MOMR issues, as are OPEC and non-OPEC
supply. However, to distinguish US shale production from more conventional US output, we
refer to the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2015a; EIA, 2016c).31 For non-OPEC
supply, capacity is assumed to equal actual output. For OPEC, sustainable capacity estimates
are taken from the IEA (2013, 2015, 2016b). As mentioned earlier, non-OPEC statistics do not
distinguish between crude and NGLs, but OPEC statistics do. We add NGLs to OPEC crude
output/capacity, resulting in volumes that are higher than more widely reported crude-only
volumes. For supply forecasts, non-OPEC capacity/output is derived from IEA (2016b) and
shale capacity is taken from EIA (2015a). The IEA does not produce OPEC supply forecasts
but OPEC capacity is taken from IEA (2016b).
We set marginal costs for US shale using Kleinberg et al. (2016) and Rystad Energy (2016);
for OPEC, we use Middle East Economic Survey (2014). OPEC’s pricing power λ is solved
for the value that makes calculated prices and quantities consistent with the data and other
parameters as per equation (2) which determines OPEC’s supply behaviour.
5.2 Accommodate examples
We present results for the second quarter of 2014 because it preceded the decline in oil prices
as well as 2012 for robustness (Table 1). Our main finding is that it was then still optimal for
30Surveys by Atkins and Jayazeri (2004) and Smith (2009) indicate a range of 0 to -0.11. Hamilton (2009) finds
elasticities that are very close to zero, but some more recent studies have found higher demand responses. Kilian
and Murphy (2014) have a preferred estimate of -0.27, which is similar to the median among a time-varying range
of elasticities in Baumeister and Peersman (2013), who themselves find elasticities have declined over time.
31Specifically, we use their data for tight oil in the lower 48 US states. Similar levels or growth rates are attained
using proxies based on individual states or for the main shale oil fields (Ba§es et al, 2015).
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OPEC to follow an accommodate strategy.
In both years, oil prices (P ) were close to $105. Actual demand (D) was 90.7 mbd in 2012
and 92 mbd in 2014. Setting β = 8 implies a price elasticity of demand of about −0.15 in both
years. Then P , D, and β can be substituted into the demand function to solve for α for each
year. Global supply exceeded demand by 0.2 mbd in 2012 and by 3.4 mbd in the second quarter
of 2014, implying large inventory builds. As discussed earlier, shale capacity (Kj) was 214 mbd in
2012 and 414 mbd in 2014, while OPEC capacity (Ki) remained constant and other non-OPEC
capacity (K`) rose.
Short-run marginal costs are set at Ci = $10 for OPEC in both years. Given the shorter
production cycles of shale, we seek to capture its “full-cycle” costs. Kleinberg et al. (2016) elect
to provide a range rather than a specific aggregate value; in light of this, we choose for 2014 a
number towards the top of the range, Cj = $85, to proxy marginal cost. We set US shale costs
in 2012 at Cj = $90 to permit modest e¢ciency gains prior to 2014. We calculate that λ ≈ 13
for both 2012 and 2014. This is broadly consistent with the OPEC literature discussed earlier,
including numerical model simulations and econometric estimates (Huppmann and Holz, 2012;
Almoguera et al., 2011), which imply λ < 12 .
Table 1: Accommodate examples
Scenario 1A 1B
Period 2012 2014Q2
P Price ($/barrel) 105 106
D Demand (mbd) 90.7 92.0
β Demand slope 8 8
Demand elasticity —.14 —.14
α Demand intercept 831 843
α/β Demand parameter 103.8 105.3
S Global supply (actual) 90.9 95.4
Si OPEC supply (actual) 37.6 36.4
S∗i OPEC supply (accommodate) 37.4 33.1
S∗∗i OPEC supply (squeeze) 41.2 39.7
Ki OPEC capacity (mbd) 41.3 41.4
Kj+K` Non-OPEC supply (mbd) 53.3 59.0
Kj US shale capacity (mbd) 2.0 4.0
K` ROW capacity (mbd) 51.3 55.0
Ki+K` Non-shale capacity (mbd) 92.7 96.3
Ci OPEC marginal cost 10 10
Cj US shale marginal cost 90 85
λ OPEC pricing power .32 .36
Kj US shale: critical size (mbd) 3.8 5.5
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The fitted data confirm that our model assumptions A1 and A2 hold in both scenarios 1A
and 1B. Consistent with A1, US shale oil is viable given that price exceeds its cost. A2 also
holds in both 2012 and 2014, which means that OPEC had su¢cient spare capacity to carry out
the squeeze strategy.
The data are consistent with an accommodate equilibrium as per Proposition 2, so OPEC
optimally chose not to pursue the squeeze. In particular, the parameters and data imply Kj =
3.8 in 2012 while Kj = 5.5 in 2014, which is above actual shale capacities of Kj = 2 and Kj = 4
in the respective years. Note however that the gap was already shrinking, so that 2014 was
closer to a regime switch than 2012. The calculated quantity supplied by OPEC under such
an equilibrium (denoted in Table 1 by S∗i as per (2)) matches the actual data (shown as S in
the table after accounting for unplanned inventory accumulation), while supply under a squeeze
equilibrium (denoted by S∗∗i as per (4)) would have been much higher.
5.3 Illustrative squeeze scenarios
Taking 2014 as a starting point, this subsection presents six constructed scenarios where a
squeeze is triggered (Table 2). The first five separately show how higher US shale capacity, lower
OPEC pricing power, lower demand, higher non-US non-OPEC capacity, or higher US shale costs
can individually trigger the switch.32 The sixth and final illustrative scenario combines multiple
drivers to generate a squeeze.
Although stylized, these scenarios show our key point that the regime switch may have been
optimal for OPEC from an ex ante viewpoint, given the information they may have incorporated
in deciding how to react to the initial price decline in the 2nd half of 2014.
We in scenario 2A illustrate a case in which all demand and cost parameters (as well as λ) are
held constant at 2014 levels but setKj = 5.5. Although illustrative, we choose this value because
shale output was forecast to reach 5.5 mbd in 2018-2024 (EIA, 2015a).33 These forecasts entail
capacity above the values of Kj calculated in the previous two scenarios and by construction
trigger a switch to a squeeze equilibrium with shale output of zero and OPEC supply of 39.7
mbd (S∗∗i from (4)) such that price is lower (P
∗∗ = Cj = 85) and global demand is higher. The
OPEC supply and global demand numbers imply an OPEC market share of 42 percent under
the squeeze, which is almost a quarter more than the 34 percent implied by the counterfactual
accommodate equilibrium. The model assumptions A1 and A2 hold: shale output would have
been positive under the counterfactual of an accommodation strategy, and OPEC indeed has
the capacity required for a squeeze. So US shale growth of ∆Kj ≈ (5.5 − 4.0) = 1.5 mbd was
just enough to trigger a switch.
Another important development discussed in Section 4 is a decline in λ representing OPEC’s
lower ability to push up prices. In scenario 2B, we also hold all 2014 parameters constant,
including Kj = 4, but now use Proposition 2 to solve for the critical value of λ such that
32Changes in OPEC capacity are only indirectly important for ensuring A1 and A2 hold.
33The rise in (forecast) shale oil capacity was part of a sequence of positive surprises and lagged upward revisions
to forecasts by the EIA. It can also be seen as OPEC having some lag in incorporating these revisions in its internal
calculation of the tradeo§s.
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Kj = Kj(λ). With this value for λ, US shale capacity of Kj = 4 makes OPEC exactly indi§erent
between the two strategies. The solved value of λ = 0.32 is only slightly lower than in scenario
1B (for which λ = 0.36); this implies that a small reduction in λ is already enough to trigger
the decision to squeeze.
Table 2: Calibrated squeeze counterfactuals
Scenario 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F
Trigger High Kj Low λ Low α High K` High Cj Multiple*
P Price ($/barrel) 85 85 85 85 92 55
D Demand (mbd) 94.7 94.7 91.3 94.7 93.8 94.4
β Demand slope 8 8 8 8 8 8
Demand elasticity —.11 —.11 —.12 —.11 -.12 —.07
α Demand intercept 843 843 816 843 843 810
α/β Demand parameter 105.3 105.3 101.9 105.3 105.3 101.3
S∗i OPEC supply (accommodate) 32.0 34.2 30.6 30.6 33.1 32.8
S∗∗i OPEC supply (squeeze) 39.7 39.7 36.4 36.4 38.9 39.4
Ki OPEC capacity (mbd) 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4 41.4
Kj+K` Non-OPEC supply (mbd) 60.5 59.0 59.0 62.4 59.0 60.5
Kj US shale capacity (mbd) 5.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.5
K` ROW capacity (mbd) 55.0 55.0 55.0 58.4 55.0 55.0
Ki+K` Non-shale capacity (mbd) 96.3 96.3 96.3 99.7 96.3 96.3
Ci OPEC marginal cost 10 10 10 10 10 10
Cj US shale marginal cost 85 85 85 85 92 55
λ OPEC pricing power .36 .32 .36 .36 .36 .21
Kj US shale: critical size 5.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.5
* Setting Cj lower and K` higher; allowing λ and α to shift endogenously.
Our next two scenarios explore sensitivities to global demand and non-OPEC production.
Scenario 2C investigates how weaker global demand can also trigger a squeeze. We again hold all
the 2014 parameters constant, including Kj = 4, but solve for the value of the demand intercept
α such that Kj(α) = 4. The results show that a demand decline of about 3 percent is enough
to induce a regime change (the change in mbd is ∆(α/β) = (101.9− 105.3) ≈ −3.4).34 Scenario
2D shows that a rise of ∆K` ≈ 3.4 mbd in non-OPEC non-shale capacity to 58.4 mbd would
also have triggered the decision to squeeze.
To understand these sensitivities, note that a demand decline, as measured by fall in α/β
(mbd), has exactly the same impact on OPEC’s profits as an equally-sized rise in non-OPEC
non-shale capacity K` (that is, −∆(α/β) = ∆K` ≈ 3.4 mbd in 2C and 2D, respectively). This
can be confirmed by inspecting the profit expressions from (3) and (5), or equivalently the
expression for Kj from Proposition 2 (in all of which −α/β and K` enter symmetrically). The
34Note that α/β measures the maximum possible demand for crude oil, since D(P ) = (α− P )/β.
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reason is that both have the same e§ect of shifting downward the residual demand curve faced
by OPEC.
The calibration to 2014 values also shows that rise in non-OPEC non-shale capacity needed
to trigger a switch (∆K` ≈ 3.4 mbd in 2D) is more than twice as large as the required rise in US
shale capacity (∆Kj ≈ 1.5 mbd in 2A). Put di§erently, a given rise in US shale capacity is more
conducive to a regime switch (to squeeze) than an identical rise in other non-OPEC capacity.
The reason is that the latter also depresses the price under the squeeze while higher US shale
capacity does not (since it, by construction, then ceases to produce).35
Scenario 2E investigates the role of US shale costs. In particular, it considers how much US
costs Cj would need to rise in order to induce a squeeze, that is, Kj(Cj) = 4, again holding
all other 2014 parameters constant. This shows that a moderate $7-rise in US costs from $85
to $92 would already have been enough to induce OPEC to switch to a squeeze. Compared to
scenarios 2A and 2B, this leads to a higher price and lower demand. In reality, as discussed in
Section 4.1, US shale costs have been declining, and thus acted against a squeeze. For example,
extending scenario 2A (Kj = 5.5) with a moderate decline in US costs from $85 to $78 would
lead to Kj = 7.0, which implies that accommodation remains optimal (preserving the “gap” of*
Kj −Kj
+
= 1.5 in scenario 1B). One interpretation is that US cost reductions–either actual
changes due to e¢ciency gains or new information prompting a downward revision in their
perceived levels–can easily undermine the case for a squeeze.
The illustrative scenarios so far imply prices well above those observed in late 2014 and early
2015. Our scenario 2F generates a lower oil price by allowing multiple parameters to shift in
a manner that is qualitatively in line with Section 4. Consistent with declining US shale costs
in Rystad Energy (2016), we illustratively set Cj = 55 = P ∗∗. Given this lower price, setting
demand to that observed for 2015 (IEA, 2016a) implies a sizeable decline in the solved value
of α relative to 2014, representing a weakening in global demand. Thus, although lower US
costs discourage the squeeze, the negative demand shift encourages it, illustrating how demand
and supply are interlinked. Letting US shale capacity Kj = 5.5, we again use Proposition 2
to find the value of λ for which Kj = Kj(λ) such that the solved value can be interpreted as
the maximum value of λ that triggers the squeeze. OPEC supply S∗∗i = 39.4 mbd under the
squeeze by (4), which is much closer to actual supply (38 mbd) than calculated supply under
accommodate (S∗i ).
In summary, scenario 2F generates a squeeze equilibrium with a more realistic oil price
through higher US shale capacity, lower OPEC pricing power, weaker demand, and falling
US production costs. OPEC’s market share is 42 percent of demand compared to 35 percent
under the accommodate counterfactual. A1 continues to hold, which implies that shale would
have been viable (aided by lower costs but harmed by inter alia weaker demand) had it been
accommodated. A2 also still holds. In terms of our qualitative discussion from Section 4, this
shows that the various factors favoring a squeeze can quantitatively outweigh lower US shale
costs.
35To confirm this formally, it is easy to check in the proof of Proposition 1: @
@K`
(∆Πi) >
@
@Kj
(∆Πi) > 0.
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5.4 Future squeeze equilibria
This subsection recalibrates the model using forecasts of oil markets in 2020. The two squeeze
equilibria imply that the market-share strategy can be rationalized economically as a “less-bad”
future option for OPEC; they also yield more plausible forecasts for OPEC output than in an
accommodate equilibrium.
In equilibrium 3A, the 2020 oil price of $56 is used to pin down marginal cost for US
shale oil. The demand parameter α is solved as before, now using third-party forecasts of P
and D, while β is unchanged. As per Proposition 2, Kj = 5.6 based on EIA (2015a) and so
Kj = Kj(λ) when λ = 0.20. Hence, OPEC supply is S∗∗i = 41.6 mbd as per (4). Under a
counterfactual accommodate equilibrium as per (2), OPEC supply (S∗i ) would be almost 7 mbd
lower. Furthermore (this is not shown in Table 3), shale output would equal capacity, OPEC’s
market share would be 35 percent, and the price would be $73.
Table 3: Illustrative future squeeze equilibria
Scenario 3A 3B
Extent of squeeze All shale Some shale
P Price ($/barrel) 56 56
D Demand (mbd) 100.5 100.5
β Demand slope 8 8
Demand elasticity —.07 —.07
α Demand intercept 860 860
α/β Demand parameter 107.5 107.5
S Global supply (actual) 100.5 100.5
S∗i OPEC supply (accommodate) 34.9 38.3
S∗∗i OPEC supply (squeeze) 41.6 38.8
Ki OPEC capacity (mbd) 43.7 43.7
Kj+K` Non-OPEC supply (mbd) 58.9 61.7
Kj US shale capacity (mbd) 5.6 2.8
K` ROW capacity (mbd) 58.9 58.9
Ki+K` Non-shale capacity (mbd) 102.6 102.6
Ci OPEC marginal cost 10 10
Cj US shale marginal cost 56 56
λ OPEC pricing power .20 .16
Kj US shale: critical size 5.6 2.8
A less stylized equilibrium includes non-zero US shale output in a way that reduces OPEC
supply while leaving global supply, prices, and demand unaltered. Equilibrium 3B relaxes the
assumption that US shale is a homogenous group. Reflecting that the level (and change) of costs
varies considerably across shale plays (Rystad Energy, 2016), it instead lets a futures price of $56
only squeeze out those with higher costs. (In terms of the model setup, j becomes the subset of
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US shale plays with costs above $56.) Setting Kj = 2.8 to represent the more expensive half of
US shale, and following the same procedure as in equilibrium 3A, a squeeze equilibrium would
result in OPEC producing 38.8 mbd and lower-cost US shale producing 2.8 mbd. We find that
Kj = Kj(λ) = 2.8 when λ = 0.16. Intuitively, for it to be worth squeezing out only half of US
shale, accommodation must be even less attractive. An interesting implication of this low value
of λ is that the counterfactual price under accommodate is only $4 higher than the squeeze price.
In this sense, US shale becomes the de facto “price-setter” in this future scenario regardless of
which equilibrium is played.
6 Conclusions
The debate about OPEC’s November 2014 switch to a “market-share” strategy has drawn con-
siderable attention. Many oil-market analysts view the decision as a battle of “OPEC vs shale”
aimed at squeezing higher-cost US players out of the market. We have contributed to this debate
with an equilibrium model that helps understand how fundamental market developments can
rationalize such a regime switch by OPEC as a profit-maximizing strategy. This can explain
why OPEC supply may optimally rise in response to high-cost supply growth (such as US shale)
or weaker global demand–and induce an oil price collapse.
Our calibration of the model shows it was better for OPEC to accommodate expanding
US shale production up to 2014 despite having the spare capacity to squeeze them out of the
market. Stylized comparative statics show how changes to OPEC’s information set at the time
could prompt the late-2014 switch to a market-share strategy. Calibration to forecasts of future
market data shows how evolving developments can sustain a regime switch to a squeeze. Through
the lens of the model, the market-share strategy can be the better of the two options–given
US shale capacity, OPEC coordination prospects, weak global oil demand, and other market
factors.
It remains to be seen whether the initial logic of the squeeze will play out and vindicate the
strategy in the coming years. As of late 2016, the squeeze appears to have been less successful
than OPEC might have calculated: the decline in US shale output has so far been fairly modest,
and the squeeze has perhaps been more costly than anticipated given the continued depression
of oil prices (IEA, 2016b). One potential reason is that US shale costs have fallen more than
might have been anticipated; relatedly, the subtleties underlying the calculation of breakeven
prices may have initially been misunderstood by some market participants (Kleinberg et al.,
2016).
In terms of our framework, further new information on these factors could prompt another
OPEC regime switch back to accommodate. OPEC’s November 2016 meeting may be a signal
of such a reversion–though it is too early to tell how substantial this will end up being. It
is also possible that the attempted squeeze and the re-entry of Iran have made coordinated
accommodation so problematic that OPEC reluctantly yet rationally persists with the squeeze.
OPEC’s market-share strategy and low oil prices may have squeezed high-cost producers be-
yond US shale. Many conventional producers have sustained production but reduced investment
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in future capacity, which suggests they will also be squeezed over a longer time horizon (IEA,
2016b; Toews and Naumov, 2016). Furthermore, the adoption of fracking in other countries–
which could have been profitable in a high-price environment–may have been deterred. This
paper has not pretended to forecast the future of the oil industry but rather to provide a co-
herent economic framework to think about the key drivers of regime switches, including the one
that took place at the end of 2014.
Finally, our approach can be applied to other energy sectors. For example, natural gas is also
characterized by significant supply-side concentration. In the EU, Gazprom plays a dominant
role in that it accounts for around 30% of gas imports. It competes against domestic supplies in
some EU countries, other pipeline exporters, and liquefied natural gas (LNG)–which likely all
have higher costs. Recent gas-policy discussions suggest that the demand slowdown and likely
future competition from US shale gas arriving in Europe as LNG mean that Gazprom should
begin a “price war” to regain market share and squeeze higher-cost LNG players (and possibly
coal production) out of the European market (Henderson 2016). This regime choice has some
close parallels with the oil-market setting, and our model could similarly be used to quantify
the conditions under which a market-share strategy becomes optimal for Gazprom.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Using (3) and (5), the profit di§erence ∆Πi ≡ (Π∗∗i −Π∗i ) equals:
∆Πi =
1
β
"
[(α− Cj)− βK`] (Cj − Ci)− λ
"
(α− Ci)− β(Kj +K`)
(1 + λ)
#2#
. (6)
For the comparative statics of (i) to (v), in turn, di§erentiation shows that
@
@Kj
(∆Πi) =
2λ
(1 + λ)2
[(α− Ci)− β(Kj +K`)] > 0
is implied by A1, and
@
@λ
(∆Πi) = − 1
β
,
(1− λ)
(1 + λ)3
[(α− Ci)− β(Kj +K`)]2
-
< 0
holds whenever λ < 1, and
@
@α
(∆Πi) =
1
β
,
(Cj − Ci)− 2λ
(1 + λ)2
[(α− Ci)− β(Kj +K`)]
-
< 0
also holds since (Cj − Ci) < λ(1+λ) [(α− Ci)− β(Kj +K`)] is A1 and 2λ(1+λ)2 ≥ λ(1+λ) since
λ 2 (0, 1], and
@
@Cj
(∆Πi) =
1
β
[[(α− Cj)− βK`]− (Cj − Ci)] > 0
holds by A1, and finally
@
@K`
(∆Πi) = −(Cj − Ci) + 2λ
(1 + λ)2
[(α− Ci)− β(Kj +K`)] > 0
also holds as a consequence of A1, thus proving parts (i)—(v).
Proof of Proposition 2. This expression for the di§erence in profits from (6) can easily be
rearranged to obtain the condition that ∆Πi(α,β,λ, Ci, Cj ,Kj ,K`) > 0, Kj > Kj , where Kj
is defined in the proposition. Plugging the critical value Kj into (1) yields:
P ∗(Kj) =
Ci + λ[α− (α− Ci) + (1 + λ)
p
(1/λ) [(α− Cj)− βK`] (Cj − Ci)]
(1 + λ)
= Ci +
q
(1/λ) [(α− Cj)− βK`] (Cj − Ci),
as claimed. It remains to check that the condition for the regime switch is itself compatible with
A1. To do so, rewrite A1 as
Kj <
,
1
β
"
(α− Ci)− (1 + λ)
λ
(Cj − Ci)
#
−K`
-
≡ bKj ,
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so we require that Kj < bKj , which holds if and only if:
(α− Ci)− (1 + λ)
q
(1/λ) [(α− Cj)− βK`] (Cj − Ci) < (α− Ci)− [(1 + λ)/λ](Cj − Ci) ()
(1/λ)(Cj − Ci) <
q
(1/λ) [(α− Cj)− βK`] (Cj − Ci) ()
(Cj − Ci) < λ [(α− Cj)− βK`] .
The last expression holds by A1, thus completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. For part (i), since the price is lower under the squeeze, P ∗∗ < P ∗ by
Proposition 2, market demand must be higher, D(P ∗∗) > D(P ∗). As non-OPEC ex-US players
production K` is unchanged, OPEC’s production must also be higher, S∗∗i ≡ {D(P ∗∗)−K`} >
{D(P ∗)−Kj −K`} ≡ S∗i . For part (ii), using the previous expressions for i’s demand from (1)
for α0 and (2) for α00 shows that S∗∗i (α
00) > S∗i (α
0) is equivalent to:
(α00 − Cj)
β
−K` > [α
0 − β(Kj +K`)− Ci]
(1 + λ)β
()
λ[α00 − Cj − βK`] + βKj > (α0 − α00) + (Cj − Ci) ()0
λ[(α00 − Cj)− β(Kj +K`)]− (Cj − Ci)
1
+ β(1 + λ)Kj > (α
0 − α00) ≡ ∆α
as claimed, and recalling that {λ[(α00 − Cj)− β(Kj +K`)]− (Cj − Ci)} > 0 is A1.
Appendix B: Data sources
Oil prices (historical and assumed) P : IMF World Economic Outlook database (October 2016).
Demand volumes (historical and forecast): International Energy Agency Medium Term Oil Mar-
ket Report (2015, 2016) and Monthly Oil Market Report (numerous issues).
Demand parameters: β = 8, in line with existing empirical work; α solved using P , D, and β.
Global supply volumes; inventory changes (realized): International Energy Agency Medium Term
Oil Market Report (2015, 2016) and Monthly Oil Market Report (numerous issues).
OPEC supply volumes (historical): International Energy Agency Medium Term Oil Market
Report (2015, 2016) and Monthly Oil Market Report (numerous issues).
OPEC supply volumes (forecast): Solved endogenously.
OPEC capacity (historical and forecast): International Energy Agency Medium Term Oil Market
Report (2015, 2016).
US shale capacity/supply (realized and forecast): Energy Information Administration (2015).
Non-OPEC capacity/supply (realized and forecast): International Energy Agency Medium Term
Oil Market Report (2015, 2016) and Monthly Oil Market Report (numerous issues).
US shale marginal cost : Selected by authors based on Kleinberg et al. (2016) and Rystad Energy
(2016) or equal to oil price forecasts (future squeeze equilibria).
OPEC marginal cost : Middle East Economic Survey (2014)
OPEC pricing power : Solved endogenously.
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